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THE FLAWED REASONING BEHIND JOHNSON V. UNITED
STATES AND A SOLUTION: WHY A FACTS-BASED APPROACH
SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED TO INTERPRET THE RESIDUAL
CLAUSE OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
Jake Albert*
INTRODUCTION
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is a United States federal law that pro-
vides sentencing enhancements to felons who commit crimes with firearms.1 The
ACCA is triggered if the felon has been convicted of certain other crimes three or
more times.2 Under the Act, anyone who has three prior convictions for a “violent
felony” or a “serious drug offense” is subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence
of fifteen years to life, instead of the ten-year maximum sentence prescribed by the
Gun Control Act.3 The applicable ACCA section defines “violent felony” and “serious
drug offense” with different categories, with one part of the “violent felony” defini-
tion including any felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.”4 This is known as the residual clause.5
The Supreme Court case Taylor v. United States6 was the first to interpret the
residual clause and established the process of determining whether a crime consti-
tutes a violent felony.7 The Court held that, when determining if a crime constitutes
a violent felony, “the only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is that, like
the rest of the enhancement statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only
to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”8 In other
words, Taylor established that a court must look to the elements of the crime of con-
viction, not the individual circumstances that led to an offender’s conviction. This
process is known as the categorical approach.9
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, William & Mary Law School; B.A., Tufts University, 2014. I
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1 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012).
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
3 Id.
4 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012), invalidated by
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
5 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
6 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 602.
9 See id. at 588–89 (employing the categorical approach to determine if attempted bur-
glary is a violent felony); see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 36–37 (2011) (Kagan, J.,
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On June 26, 2015, in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court issued a ruling
that declared the residual clause unconstitutional.10 The Court held that the clause—
requiring a court to look only at the elements of the crime of conviction—leaves
grave uncertainty as to estimating the risk involved in any crime, and that it pro-
duces unpredictability and arbitrariness from judges.11 For these reasons the Court
held that the clause violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for
vagueness.12 In so holding, the Court contradicted four of its own decisions from the
past decade that applied the residual clause.13 Justice Alito filed a lengthy dissent,
stating that “the Court is not stopped by the well-established rule that a statute is
void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications” because, he asserted, the
Court simply wanted to get rid of all residual clause cases for the future.14
The decision has left questions that affect many individuals sentenced under this
statute, including whether the decision will be applied retroactively and allow for
resentencing hearings for those individuals. Furthermore, there is now a circuit split
over whether the holding of Johnson should be applied to other statutes, including
an identical statute in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.15
This Note will first analyze the applicable ACCA section, the prior case law over-
ruled by Johnson, and the majority opinion and dissent of Johnson. It will argue that
the Court’s analysis in Johnson is flawed, that the problem is not with the wording
of the residual clause, but instead with the categorical approach that was previously
used to analyze residual clause cases. It will then argue that a different approach to
the residual clause, looking to the facts of a defendant’s prior convictions, is work-
able, and therefore the Court should not have declared the clause unconstitutional.
Finally, this Note will then look to the implications of the decision and argue that
similar sentencing enhancement statutes are now unconstitutional after Johnson.
dissenting) (“Because we use the ‘categorical approach,’ we do not concern ourselves with
Sykes’s own conduct.”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202, 207–09 (2007), over-
ruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
10 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
11 Id. at 2557–58.
12 Id. at 2558.
13 Id. at 2562–63. The four cases are Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), overruled
by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122
(2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); and James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192
(2007), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015).
14 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2573–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
15 Some Circuits have, since Johnson, held that the identical statute, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a),
is not automatically unconstitutional, while some have refused to analyze the constitutional
issue altogether. There is now a circuit split on the issue, with the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits explicitly holding § 4B1.2 unconstitutionally vague; the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
explicitly holding § 4B1.2 constitutional; and the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits ex-
pressing concerns about the constitutionality of § 4B1.2, but failing to address the issue. See
infra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act
It is a federal offense for a felon to be in illegal possession of a firearm.16 The
ACCA states that any felon who is convicted of illegally possessing a firearm and
who has three prior convictions for a “violent felony,” “serious drug offense,” or both,
“committed on occasions different from one another,” shall be “imprisoned not less
than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall
not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person.”17 The
definition of “violent felony” is as follows:
[T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile
delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or
destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for
such term if committed by an adult, that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explo-
sives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.18
The last part of the definition, a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” is known as the residual clause.19
The “Act was intended to supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts against
‘career’ criminals. The House Report accompanying the Act explained that a ‘large
percentage’ of crimes of theft and violence ‘are committed by a very small percentage
16 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
17 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
18 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
19 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)
(defining a “crime of violence” as any crime that “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extor-
tion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”) (emphasis added). While Johnson discusses the
residual clause of the ACCA statute, the Sentencing Guidelines are also implicitly impli-
cated. See infra Part III.A and accompanying notes. “[T]he Act’s definition of ‘violent
felony,’ 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is identical in all relevant respects to the Guidelines’ definition
of ‘crime of violence,’ U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)[,]” and the same approach is applied. United States
v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 443 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52,
55 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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of repeat offenders . . . .’”20 Robbery and burglary, according to the study, are the
crimes most committed by these career offenders.21
B. The Vagueness Doctrine
The purpose and procedure of finding a law void for vagueness has been well
established by Supreme Court precedent.22 Vagueness is a component of due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,23 and is meant to ensure a citizen can choose
legal from illegal conduct, for “[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not providing
fair warning.”24 “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that
a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”25 “These principles apply not
only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”26
Thus, a statute can be unconstitutionally vague for either of two reasons: (1) if
it fails to provide a person of reasonable intelligence what conduct is prohibited; or
(2) if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.27 “[T]he
more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other prin-
cipal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement.’”28
In practice, courts generally look to case law to see if other courts have created
a standard for determining what a criminal must do in order to satisfy the statute’s
requirements,29 whether the statute contains a scienter requirement,30 the type of
people affected by the law,31 and to whether the amount of and subjectivity of the
delegation given to “policemen, judges, and juries” is too arbitrary.32 However, the
Court has recognized that “because we are ‘[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can
never expect mathematical certainty from our language.’”33
20 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at
1, 3 (1984)).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983).
23 Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 485 (2d Cir. 2006).
24 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
25 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 (internal citations omitted).
26 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (citing United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
27 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
28 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
29 Id.
30 Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
31 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972).
32 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
33 Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110).
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C. Prior Residual Clause Cases
1. Taylor v. United States
There are a few important cases to know and understand that preceded and
likely influenced the Court in Johnson. The first, Taylor v. United States, established
the categorical approach in determining whether a crime is a crime of violence.34
The Court held that, when determining if a crime constitutes a “violent felony,” “the
only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is that, like the rest of the enhance-
ment statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction
and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”35 Thus, a court must look only to
the elements of the crime of conviction and not the individual circumstances of the
defendant’s past crimes.
The Court had several reasons for advancing this approach. First, the Court stated
that this approach was Congress’s intent, which the Court stated was shown from
phrasing the statute as “a person who . . . has three prior convictions” instead of “a
person who has committed” three prior offenses.36 Second, the Court thought there
were practical difficulties and potential unfairness from using a fact-of-conviction
approach.37 The Court worried that charging documents would not always be avail-
able and that “in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty, there is often no record
of the underlying facts.”38
Thus the categorical approach was established for evaluating residual clause
cases, and would remain in use until Johnson.
2. James v. United States
The beginning of the recent string of cases that Johnson would eventually
overrule is James v. United States.39 In James, the Court stated that “Congress’
inclusion of a broad residual provision in clause (ii) indicates that it did not intend
the preceding enumerated offenses to be an exhaustive list of the types of crimes that
might present a serious risk of injury to others . . . .”40
34 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
35 Id. at 602 (employing the categorical approach to determine if attempted burglary is
a violent felony); see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 36–37 (2011) (Kagan, J., dis-
senting) (“Because we use the ‘categorical approach,’ we do not concern ourselves with Sykes’s
own conduct.”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202, 207–09 (2007), overruled by
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
36 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
37 Id. at 601.
38 Id.
39 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
40 Id. at 200.
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The defendant in James argued that attempted burglary—not completed bur-
glary—should not constitute a violent felony, but the Court applied the categorical
approach and determined that because of the term “potential risk” in the residual
clause, “Congress intended to encompass possibilities even more contingent or re-
mote than a simple ‘risk,’ much less a certainty.”41
Justice Scalia, with whom Justices Ginsberg and Stevens joined, filed a dissent
advocating for a new framework in residual clause cases, arguing that the risk of
crimes should be evaluated against the least-risky enumerated crime, which he stated
is burglary.42 Scalia believed this would provide clearer guidelines to lower courts
interpreting the statute.43 However, the Court stated that the clause “is not so
indefinite as to prevent an ordinary person from understanding” its scope.44
3. Begay v. United States
The next case, Begay v. United States,45 discussed in detail the residual clause’s
scope.46 The Court stated: “In our view, the provision’s listed examples . . . illustrate
the kinds of crimes that fall within the statute’s scope. Their presence indicates that
the statute covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.’”47 The Court thus applied the categori-
cal approach and determined that the residual clause applied to crimes similar to
those explicitly listed earlier in the statute instead of all potentially violent crimes.48
When applied to the case at hand, the Court held that driving under the influence
did not constitute a violent felony because it did not involve “purposeful, ‘violent,’ and
‘aggressive’ conduct,” differentiating it from the crimes enumerated in the statute.49
4. Sykes v. United States
Finally, the Court last addressed the residual clause in 2011 in Sykes v. United
States.50 The Court discussed the previous residual clause cases and, applying the
41 Id. at 207–08. This reasoning is important for my discussion on the Court’s holding in
the Johnson case, infra Part II.A.
42 James, 550 U.S. at 214–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 216.
44 Id. at 210 n.6 (majority opinion).
45 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
46 Id. at 141–44.
47 Id. at 142 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 144–45 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006)
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part), rev’d, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)).
50 564 U.S. 1 (2011).
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categorical approach as it had in the past, determined that vehicular flight from police
is a violent felony.51
Addressing the vagueness of the residual clause, the Court stated that the clause
“states an intelligible principle and provides guidance that allows a person to ‘con-
form his or her conduct to the law.’ Although this approach may at times be more
difficult for courts to implement, it is within congressional power to enact.”52 The
Court went on to cite eight different federal laws that also rely on similar wording,
such as assessing “risk,” “substantial risk,” or “foreseeable risk of bodily injury to
another person.”53
Justice Scalia filed a strongly worded dissent, stating that, regarding the Court’s
fourth case in recent history to interpret the residual clause, “[i]nsanity, it has been
said, is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different results.
Four times is enough. We should admit that ACCA’s residual provision is a drafting
failure and declare it void for vagueness.”54 Scalia would go on to state that the
Court’s inability to craft a clear test leads to arbitrary enforcement and uncertainty.55
No other Justices joined in his dissent in this case from 2011.56
D. Johnson v. United States: The Holding
In Johnson, the appellant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,
and the government successfully argued for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.57
The government relied on a prior conviction for unlawful possession of a short-
barreled shotgun as a prior violent felony.58 Such a conviction is not one of the
enumerated violent felonies in § 924, so it would normally be analyzed under the
residual clause and the categorical approach framework.59 Instead of this framework,
the Court decided that the residual clause violates the Due Process Clause of the
51 Id. at 16.
52 Id. at 15–16 (internal citations omitted).
53 Id. (citing the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1031(b)(2) (2006) (“conscious or reckless
risk of serious personal injury”); 18 U.S.C. § 2118(e)(3) (2006) (“risk of death, significant
physical pain”); 18 U.S.C. § 2246(4) (2006) (“substantial risk of death, unconsciousness,
extreme physical pain”); 18 U.S.C. § 2258B(b)(2)(B) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (“substantial risk
of causing physical injury”); 18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2006) (“forseeable risk of . . . death or
serious bodily injury to another person” (footnote omitted)); 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2006)
(“substantial risk of bodily injury to another person”); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246(a), (d), (d)(2), (e),
(e)(1), (e)(2), (f), (g) (2006) (same); 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c)(4)(C) (2006) (same)).
54 Id. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 34 (“The Court’s ever-evolving interpretation of the residual clause will keep
defendants and judges guessing for years to come.”).
56 Id. at 28–35.
57 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2557.
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Fourteenth Amendment for vagueness, declared the clause unconstitutional, remanded
the appellant’s case, and explicitly overturned James and Sykes.60
The Court began by discussing how laws are determined unconstitutionally
vague, and the specific problem with the wording of the residual clause.61 The Court
took issue specifically with the phrase “potential risk,” stating that “assessing ‘po-
tential risk’ seemingly requires the judge to imagine how the idealized ordinary case
of the crime subsequently plays out.”62 The Court discussed how in James the majority
had one idea of the risk imposed by an “ordinary” attempted burglary and the dissent
had another, and that “[t]he residual clause offers no reliable way to choose between
these competing accounts of what ‘ordinary’ attempted burglary involves.”63
The Court stated that “the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony,” and, regarding coming to a
determination that attempted burglary in James did qualify, stated that “that rule . . .
offers no help at all with respect to the vast majority of offenses . . . .”64 The Court
stated that the residual clause precedent “failed to establish any generally applicable
test that prevents the risk comparison required by the residual clause from devolving
into guesswork and intuition,” saying the precedent “did not (and could not) elimi-
nate the need to imagine the kind of conduct typically involved in a crime.”65
Thus, the Court held that both tests for vagueness mentioned above66 were met:
the residual clause was not clear enough that an ordinary citizen would understand the
conduct that it prohibited, and the clause encouraged arbitrary enforcement by judges.67
Finally, the Court addressed the dozens of federal and state criminal laws that
use terms like “substantial risk” and “grave risk,” and stated that the holding does
not threaten the constitutionality of such laws because the statutes “require gauging
the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant engages on a particular
occasion[,]” as opposed to the residual clause analysis of looking at an “idealized
ordinary case of the crime.”68
In response to the argument that the Court should interpret the residual clause
in the aforementioned “acceptable” way of looking at the particular conduct in which
the defendant engaged, the Court was dismissive, stating that (1) “the Government
has not asked us to abandon the categorical approach in residual-clause cases[,]”69
60 Id. at 2557, 2563.
61 Id. at 2556–57.
62 Id. at 2557–58.
63 Id. at 2558.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2559.
66 See supra Part I.B.
67 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.
68 Id. at 2561.
69 Id. at 2562.
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and (2) “Taylor had good reasons to adopt the categorical approach,” including that
“no record of the underlying facts may be available.”70
E. Johnson v. United States: Justice Alito’s Dissent
Justice Alito filed a lengthy dissent in which he makes several arguments as to
why the residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague.71 Alito began by discussing
stare decisis, noting that “the Court holds that the residual clause is unconstitution-
ally vague even though we have twice rejected that very argument within the last
eight years.”72 Alito noted that in both James and Sykes, vagueness was mentioned
by Justice Scalia in dissent, but that the Court explicitly held otherwise, stating that
the scope of the clause was “understandable” to an ordinary person.73 The fact that
Scalia was the only Justice four years ago before Johnson’s decision to believe the
clause to be vague, with no further cases in between, led Alito to argue that “[n]othing
has changed since our decisions in James and Sykes—nothing, that is, except the
Court’s weariness with ACCA cases.”74
Next, Justice Alito argued that the threshold for the Fifth Amendment prohibi-
tion on vague laws is incredibly high, especially with sentencing provisions, for “Due
Process does not require, as Johnson oddly suggests, that a ‘prospective criminal’
be able to calculate the precise penalty that a conviction would bring.”75
Finally, Justice Alito’s main argument was that courts should stop using the
categorical approach with residual clause cases and instead apply the provision to
real-world conduct.76 “The Court all but concedes that the residual clause would be
constitutional if it applied to ‘real-world conduct.’”77 Regarding the use of the
categorical approach, Alito stated that the “ACCA, however, makes no reference to
‘an idealized ordinary case of the crime.’ That requirement was the handiwork of
this Court in [Taylor].”78
Justice Alito argued that the reasons set forth in Taylor for adopting the categorical
approach, especially the practical difficulties of unduly burdening the courts and po-
tential unfairness, do not dictate that the categorical approach must be used.79 “Indeed,
the Court’s main argument for overturning the statute is that this approach is unmanage-
able in residual clause cases.”80 Instead, Alito argued that looking to the real-world
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2573–84 (Alito, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 2573.
73 Id. at 2575.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2577.
76 Id. at 2577–80.
77 Id. at 2578.
78 Id. at 2577.
79 Id. at 2579.
80 Id.
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conduct of the offender is manageable, preferable, and eliminates any concern over
vagueness.81 While it may be difficult to determine whether, in an idealized general
case, handling a sawed-off shotgun is a violent felony, Alito argued that if we are
given the specific facts, such as that a defendant was concealing the shotgun under-
neath a jacket and looking for the man who had killed his brother, the crime is
clearly a violent felony.82
II. THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. The Court Should Look to the Facts of Conviction Instead of Using the
Categorical Approach
The Court was wrong with its holding in Johnson. The Court’s analysis is
flawed: the problem is not with the wording of the residual clause, but instead with
the categorical approach.
The Court’s own words in the majority opinion repeat time and again that as-
sessing the “potential risk” requires a judge to imagine the idealized ordinary case
of the crime.83 This process, called the categorical approach, is the problem. Just
because applying the categorical approach to this issue causes vagueness problems
does not mean the statute should go away,84 but that the process that interprets it this
way should go away.
The Court should have interpreted the residual clause as a separate entity from
the rest of the statute for the exact reason that they ruled it unconstitutional: there
are no specifically enumerated crimes.85 That fact does not, as the Court suggests,86
81 Id. at 2579–80.
82 Id. at 2579.
83 Id. at 2557–58 (majority opinion).
84 Id. at 2576 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The strong presumptive validity that attaches to an
Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not automatically
invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain mar-
ginal offenses fall within their language.”) (quoting United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp.,
372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963)); id. at 2576–77 (“A statute is thus void for vagueness only if it wholly
‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”) (quoting
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). The Court in Sykes explicitly stated that
the residual clause “states an intelligible principle and provides guidance that allows a person
to ‘conform his or her conduct to the law.’” Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (2011) (citing
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (plurality opinion)).
85 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57, 2563 (majority opinion) (explaining that the re-
sidual clause is separate from the enumerated crimes in the ACCA and that the decision in
Johnson does not affect the application of the statute in regards to the four enumerated
offenses in the ACCA).
86 Id. at 2561 (“Almost none of the cited laws links a phrase such as ‘substantial risk’ to
a confusing list of examples” like the residual clause).
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create more confusion, but instead should be considered suggestive that the clause
is meant to encompass more than just the enumerated crimes. The clause would not
exist if it were simply repeating the previous crimes, but only if it was meant to
encompass what the other listed crimes did not.
Just because a statute involves assessing the level of risk involved does not mean
it is unconstitutionally vague.87 The majority even recognizes this point, stating that
“[a]s a general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the ap-
plication of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct . . . .”88
The majority states that such a standard applied to real world facts allows for more
predictability than to the imaginary ideal of the categorical approach.89
One could easily imagine a system in which the circumstances of a defendant’s
past criminal actions are examined to determine if he or she had committed a violent
felony. Much like the circumstances of a criminal action are researched and mitigat-
ing factors are considered at a normal criminal sentencing,90 the circumstances of the
crime are essential in determining whether it was violent. Unfairness does not result
from this procedure as the majority suggests,91 but instead unfairness results when
someone who commits what most would consider a nonviolent felony, such as own-
ing a sawed-off shotgun in a locked safe in a bedroom as protection against intruders,
must be considered the same as a person who is found with a concealed sawed-off
shotgun in public looking for someone.92
The residual clause, using the categorical approach, is thus inherently unfair.
But the solution is not to then get rid of a clause that has been the law for over thirty
years and has been used in sentencing with no qualms from the Supreme Court (with
the exception of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Sykes)93 up until this decision. The solution
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(4) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily
injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, pro-
tracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty . . . .”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012)
(“Notwithstanding any other law, an indictment may be found or an information instituted
at any time without limitation for any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), if the com-
mission of such offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily
injury to another person.”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g) (2012) (“substantial risk
of bodily injury to another person”) (emphasis added).
88 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561.
89 Id.
90 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–25 (2003) (holding that failure of an attorney
to expand an investigation of possible mitigating factors at sentencing resulted in ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113
(1982) (discussing the importance of considering all mitigating factors at sentencing, and
holding that to do otherwise violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
91 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.
92 Justice Alito argues that this second example is very clearly a violent felony. Id. at
2579 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing possession of a sawed-off shotgun to be a violent felony for ACCA sentencing purposes).
93 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
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is to use an approach that looks at what actually happened in each case, not an assess-
ment describing typical conduct.
The majority recognizes this argument, and briefly (and sweepingly) dismisses it
on a few different grounds.94 First, the majority “decline[d]” to “jettison for the residual
clause (though not for the enumerated crimes) the categorical approach adopted in
Taylor and reaffirmed in each of our four residual-clause cases.”95 However, the Court
is hypocritical in that statement. In holding the residual clause unconstitutional, the
Court is completely jettisoning the holdings of Taylor and each of the four recent
residual clause cases. In each of those cases, the Court developed a clear standard
and issued a ruling on whether the defendant’s conduct was a violent felony.96
On the one hand, the Court is saying that because it has never looked at the
actual conduct of the defendant, and is not being asked to do so by the Government,
it will not change the process.97 On the other hand, the Court is saying that although
it has created a standard for the residual clause before, and was not asked by either
party to look at the clause under the vagueness doctrine, it would ignore precedent and
analyze it for vagueness anyway.98 The Court is saying it will not consider changing
the residual clause procedure because it was not asked to do so, but then nixing the
entire procedure even though it was not asked to do so.99 Instead of choosing to
respect precedent generally, the Court is deciding that the reasoning of the Taylor
Court from 1986 is more important and stronger than the reasoning of multiple cases
within the past decade.
Next, the majority cites the Government not asking the Court to abandon the
categorical approach as a reason for not considering it.100 However, the appellant in
this case never asked the Court to consider whether the residual clause was unconsti-
tutionally vague.101 The Court took it upon itself to bring up one argument that was
not before it because the Court thought it was compelling,102 only to then decline to
consider another argument citing that it was not brought before them as the reason
for not considering it.103
It is one thing for the Court to analyze both arguments and come to an opinion.
Had the Court done this and considered the merits of straying from the categorical
approach, there would be less to debate. It is another thing to consider vagueness
94 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561–62 (majority opinion).
95 Id. at 2562 (internal citations omitted).
96 See supra Part I.C.
97 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561–62.
98 Id. at 2562.
99 Id. at 2561–62.
100 Id. at 2562.
101 Id. at 2580 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Johnson did not ask us to hold that the residual clause
is unconstitutionally vague, but the Court interjected that issue into the case, requested sup-
plemental briefing on the question, and heard reargument.”).
102 Id. at 2556 (majority opinion).
103 Id. at 2562.
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when it was not asked to consider it, while not considering abandoning the categori-
cal approach because it was not asked to consider it.
B. The Court’s Concerns Are No Longer Applicable
The majority states that the Taylor court “had good reasons to adopt the categorical
approach,” especially the “impracticability of requiring a sentencing court to re-
construct, long after the original conviction, the conduct underlying that conviction.”104
However, the Court has said that using hypothetical situations will not support a
facial attack on a statute.105
Determining whether a crime was categorically a crime of violence back in 1990
was significantly more difficult than examining records of conviction is today.106
With many records now computerized107 with detailed Presentence Reports, and
with courts now requiring a defendant to agree to the exact facts of the conviction
prior to accepting a guilty plea,108 many of the concerns over reconstructing the facts
underlying a conviction simply are no longer as relevant.
The Court also looked to the other reason from Taylor, that the statute refers to
“convictions for” three prior felonies instead of wording it as “a person who has com-
mitted” three prior violent felonies.109 However, in the original version of the statute,
the term “burglary” was defined, insinuating that Congress intended the courts to look
at the specific facts of the defendant’s crimes to see if they matched the definition.110
Only later was the definition taken out for a more categorical procedure.111
104 Id.
105 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (“More importantly, speculation about pos-
sible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the Court will not support a facial attack
on a statute when it is surely valid ‘in the vast majority of its intended applications.’”) (quoting
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960)).
106 See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 178, 190–91 (2008) (“The [FBI] has
recently proposed adding the arrests of adults and juveniles for minor offenses to the types
of criminal records it accepts from the states for inclusion in the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC). Information stored in the NCIC is available to law enforcement . . . through-
out the country. . . . By 2007, the NCIC contained eighteen databases, several of which did not
depend upon a previous conviction or even on an arrest.”).
107 Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1806 (2012) (“Criminal records are increasingly
available to all branches of the government and all segments of the public through computer
databases, thus making collateral consequences more susceptible to ready enforcement.”).
108 Alexander v. State, 488 So. 2d 41, 42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (“In a guilty plea pro-
ceeding, the trial judge should undertake a factual inquiry to determine if the plea is voluntarily
made with an understanding of the nature of the charge and of the consequences of the plea.
The trial judge should also be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.”).
109 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.
110 See id. at 2579 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
589–90 (1990)).
111 Id.
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Regardless, taking a real-world, actual circumstances of crimes approach is not
unreasonable and the concerns with such an approach have certainly lessened over
the last twenty-five years.
C. Such a Facts-Based Approach Is Already Currently Used
There is a statute in the Sentencing Guidelines that is in all respects identical to
the residual clause.112 In the Commentary to the statute, the Sentencing Commission
states that “in determining whether an offense is a crime of violence or controlled
substance for the purposes of § 4B1.1 (Career Offender), the offense of conviction
(i.e., the conduct of which the defendant was convicted) is the focus of inquiry.”113
This Commentary seems to imply that the Sentencing Commission believes, for this
provision, that one can look to the conduct of the defendant.
While it can be argued that this statement only reiterates that one should look
to the conduct of the crime and not the real-world facts, certain courts have used a
“modified categorical approach” in which they do look to the actual facts underlying
an offender’s conviction.114
For instance, when determining if a conviction constitutes a “crime of violence,”
the Second Circuit employs a two-step “modified categorical approach.”115 The first
step is to look at the statute as a whole to determine if the statute exclusively
criminalizes conduct that falls within U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s definition of a violent
crime.116 “If so, the inquiry ends.”117 If the statute also criminalizes conduct that does
not qualify as a crime of violence, then the government carries the burden of proving
that the conviction rested on facts identifying the conviction as one for a violent
crime.118 “The modified categorical approach is merely a tool for district courts to
use to ‘determine which alternative element in a divisible statute formed the basis
of the defendant’s conviction.’”119
Additionally, a district court may look to certain documents to determine which
subsection of a statute a defendant was convicted under, including “charging docu-
ments, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions
112 See infra Part III.A.
113 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 4B1.2 (emphasis added).
114 See infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
115 United States v. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 443 (2d Cir. 2010)).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. (quoting Walker, 595 F.3d at 444).
119 United States v. Barker, 723 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2293 (2013)).
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of law from a bench trial, and jury instructions and verdict forms.”120 However, a
district court may not rely on a presentence report’s description of a prior crime to
determine if it was a violent crime.121
There is no reason why such an approach would not also work for the residual
clause of the ACCA. The system and rules are already in place as to researching the
conduct that constituted a conviction for the residual clause of § 4B1.2, which has
the exact same wording.122 It seems apparent that if the goal of a career offender
sentencing statute such as the ACCA is to punish more severely those criminals that
pose the greatest threat,123 the best way to know who poses such a threat is to look
at the actions of the defendants, not a generic definition of a crime. The Court should
have at least brought up and considered such an approach, especially because it is
already implemented in federal courts.124
It is understandable that the facts of conviction for certain crimes committed in
the past may not be obtainable. However, that is not a strong enough reason to avoid
a possible alternative to the categorical approach. If the facts are not available and
the crime is not one of those enumerated in the statute, then the government simply
would not meet its burden and the crime could not be used to increase a defendant’s
sentence.125 This approach would allow for the statutory sentence increase for crimes
where the facts of conviction demonstrate violence, while simply avoiding that in-
crease where the facts of conviction are missing or unclear.
Overall, the Court is saying that the residual clause is only vague because of the
categorical approach, yet then saying it will not change from the categorical approach
because of impracticability, and yet then saying that other statutes that use such an
impractical process are lawful.126 Any first-year law student can see the problems
with the structure of such an argument.
A facts-based approach may have had potential issues in the past, but given the
plethora of advances in technology, accompanied by the fact that the facts of a given
crime are already used in other court proceedings, advancing such an approach for
the residual clause would work, and would alleviate the vagueness of the statute.
120 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010).
121 Reyes, 691 F.3d at 459 (“[A] sentencing court may not rely on a PSR’s description of
a defendant’s pre-arrest conduct that resulted in a prior conviction to determine that the prior
offense constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), even where the de-
fendant does not object to the PSR’s description.”).
122 See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority of violent
crimes are committed by repeat offenders, and the ACCA statute was created in order to have
a stronger sentence for these offenders).
124 See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
125 See Reyes, 691 F.3d at 458 (citing United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 443 (2d Cir.
2010)) (stating how the Government carries the burden of proving that the prior convictions
were for violent felonies).
126 See supra Part II.A.
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D. Applying the Vagueness Doctrine to a Facts-Based Approach
Given that the residual clause, due to the categorical approach, was ruled void
for vagueness, it is necessary to apply the vagueness doctrine to the solution ad-
vanced by this Note: the facts-based approach. Specifically, this section will exam-
ine whether the statute “define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”127
The Court states that, “unlike the part of the definition of a violent felony that
asks whether the crime ‘has as an element the use . . . of physical force,’ the residual
clause asks whether the crime ‘involves conduct’ that presents too much risk of
physical injury.”128 It is unclear, according to the Court, exactly what an ordinary
person could look to in order to determine whether a certain activity would “involve
conduct” that presents too much risk of physical injury to another.129 However, when
taking away the categorical approach and employing a facts-based approach, there
is no longer an “ordinary case” of the crime to look to. Instead, a court can look to
the individual circumstances of the crime to determine if the crime was violent. Taking
out the hypothetical and replacing it with the reality eliminates the Court’s concerns
of the “ordinary case.”
Attempting to measure the risk of physical injury to another for a crime one is
about to commit is possible: if one were to break into a home, there is almost cer-
tainly a serious potential risk of injury to another.130 However, the Johnson Court
states that there are multiple ways to attempt to measure the risk—statistics, case
law, experts, etc.131—and without knowing what to look for, where to look for it, and
what a judge will ultimately look to, the clause does not rise to the level of a clear
law that an ordinary person would understand.132 But giving a judge the actual facts
behind an individual’s conviction does not invite the same level of arbitrariness as
attempting to decipher an “ordinary case” of a crime. In fact, it is well within a judge’s
already given discretion: judges already consider the severity of a crime using the
individual circumstances of the crime when deciding a sentence, just as they consider
mitigating factors.133
127 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
128 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
129 Id.
130 United States v. Walker, 631 F. App’x 753, 755 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that second-
degree burglary of a dwelling under Florida state law is a crime of violence).
131 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (“How does one go about deciding what kind of conduct
the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves? ‘A statistical analysis of the state reporter? A survey?
Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?’”) (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948,
952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)).
132 Id.
133 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The possibility of one offender’s actions falling under the clause while another’s
actions, equally or more violent but not specifically enumerated, does not, invites
the unfairness and arbitrariness that the vagueness doctrine is meant to prevent. If
an offender commits a violent act, he or she should be subject to the increased sen-
tence under the ACCA whether or not the violent act was one enumerated in the
statute. By eliminating the catch-all clause, the Court opens a loophole whereby
felons can attempt to manufacture a nonviolent history by bargaining for a plea for
a crime not specifically listed in the clause. This is inherently unfair, and is likely
why the clause was included in the first place.
It is better to look to the facts of the conviction and judge whether or not a crime
is violent than to eliminate the clause altogether.134 Otherwise we are left with the
possibility of increasing one offender’s sentence and not another’s simply because
one of the violent felonies was listed and the other was not.
III. IMPLICATIONS ON SIMILAR FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
No matter one’s views on whether the holding of Johnson is correct, the fact re-
mains that the residual clause is now gone, being ruled unconstitutionally vague. The
further fact remains that the residual clause is very similar to dozens of federal and
state laws,135 and thus there is now a question of whether such laws can survive under
the test and outcome of Johnson. This Note argues that such federal and state laws—a
couple of which will be mentioned and analyzed—are now unconstitutional.
A. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2
The United States Sentencing Commission establishes the sentencing policies
and practices of the federal courts.136 The Commission crafts the Sentencing Guide-
lines, which are a part of the federal rules.137 Federal courts are required to calculate
the Guidelines’ sentencing range for each defendant being sentenced and use the
range as a starting point in the sentencing process.138
One such Guideline section is a sentencing enhancement very similar to that of the
ACCA.139 Instead of a sentencing enhancement mandating fifteen years minimum
for three or more prior convictions for a violent felony, § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines
requires a sentencing enhancement that increases the offender’s sentencing level by
134 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2575–80 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A] statute is void for vague-
ness only if it is vague in all its applications.”).
135 Id. at 2561 (majority opinion); Id. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting).
136 About, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/about [http://perma.cc/M4BZ
-4T65].
137 Id.
138 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007).
139 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 4B1.1.
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labeling him or her a “career offender” for three or more prior convictions for a
“crime of violence.”140 A crime of violence is defined in § 4B1.2 as follows:
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under fed-
eral or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, that—
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre-
sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.141
The last part of the definition, “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another,” is known as the residual clause of the
section, and is identical to the wording of the residual clause of the ACCA statute.142
Several times courts have recognized the similarities among the statutes,143 while
one court has actually held the same offense to violate one provision but not the
other.144
With not only a similar statute but also the exact wording of the residual clause,
the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause is unconstitutional. Yet the Court in
Johnson did not mention the statute in its holding, and the new Commentary to the
Sentencing Guidelines that took effect in November 2015 still includes the clause.145
If the ACCA clause is unconstitutionally vague because it denies an offender fair
notice by increasing a sentence to a mandatory minimum of years, then the exact
same words must also be deemed unconstitutionally vague in the context of increas-
ing an offender’s sentence level.
140 Id.
141 Id. § 4B1.2 (emphasis added).
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
143 See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (“The United States Sentencing Commission has come to a similar
conclusion with regard to the Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender enhancement, whose
definition of a predicate ‘crime of violence’ closely tracks ACCA’s definition of ‘violent
felony.’”). “[T]he [ACCA]’s definition of ‘violent felony,’ 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is iden-
tical in all relevant respects to the Guidelines’ definition of ‘crime of violence,’ U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a),” and the same approach is applied. United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 443
n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1995)).
144 United States v. Hood, 628 F.3d 669, 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that possession of
a sawed-off shotgun is a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines but is not a “violent felony”
under the ACCA due to Commentary to the Guidelines expressly discussing possession of
a sawed-off shotgun as violent).
145 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 19, at § 4B1.2 cmt. 1.
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Some circuits have, since Johnson, held that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) is not auto-
matically unconstitutional,146 while some have refused to analyze the constitutional
issue altogether.147 There is now a circuit split on the issue, with the Sixth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits explicitly holding § 4B1.2 unconstitutionally vague;148 the Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits explicitly holding § 4B1.2 constitutional;149 and the First,
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits expressing concerns about the constitutionality of
§ 4B1.2 but failing to address the issue.150 The primary concern is that while the
ACCA is a federal statute, the Guidelines are merely advisory to federal courts and
are not federal law.151
146 See infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
147 See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
148 United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The concerns about
judicial inconsistency that motivated the Court in Johnson lead us to conclude that the
residual clause of the Guidelines is also unconstitutionally vague.”); Ramirez v. United States,
799 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e proceed on the assumption that the Supreme
Court’s reasoning applies to section 4B1.2 as well.”); United States v. Darden, 605 F. App’x
545, 546 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We have previously interpreted both residual clauses identically,
and Darden deserves the same relief as Johnson: the vacating of his sentence.”) (internal
citations omitted).
149 United States v. Walker, 631 F. App’x 753, 755–56 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We recently
held in United States v. Matchett that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the guidelines
is not unconstitutionally vague because advisory sentencing guidelines cannot be unconstitu-
tionally vague. We reasoned that Johnson was limited by its own terms to criminal statutes,
like the ACCA, that define elements of a crime or fix punishments—neither of which the
advisory guidelines do. The vagueness doctrine, we explained, rests on a lack of notice, but
the Sentencing Guidelines, because they are merely advisory, cannot give rise to an expec-
tation protected by due process. Therefore, Matchett precludes the success of Walker’s argument
based on Johnson that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the guidelines is unconstitu-
tionally vague.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 933 (8th
Cir. 2015) (“The reasoning in Wivell that the guidelines cannot be unconstitutionally vague
because they do not proscribe conduct is doubtful after Johnson.”).
150 United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 802 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Intervening au-
thority has called the residual clause into question. . . . We do not decide whether the residual
clause of the guidelines fails under Johnson.”); United States v. Doe, 806 F.3d 732, 752 n.11
(3d Cir. 2015) (“Because the need to decide whether that case invalidated the career-offender
provision depends on the interpretation of a very recent Supreme Court opinion and on how
the District Court will exercise its discretion over any amendment that is sought, we believe
it sensible to remand this case without addressing Johnson.”); United States v. Willis, 795
F.3d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e have not yet considered whether the due process
concerns that led Johnson to invalidate the ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness are
equally applicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. We need not resolve this issue to dispose of
this appeal.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2543 (2016); United States v. Parral-Dominguez, 794
F.3d 440, 444 n.4 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We also note that the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Johnson concerned the similar risk-of-injury language in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)
and does not affect our decision in this case.”) (internal citations omitted).
151 See supra note 149.
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However, even though the Guidelines are advisory, both sections concern the
same consequences for an offender (an increased sentence), and both clauses have
the same wording.152 Regarding the issue of the ACCA being a statute and the Guide-
lines being advisory, “district court[s] should begin all sentencing proceedings by
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range[,]”153 thus making them manda-
tory in this respect, and the Sentencing Guidelines can be challenged “notwithstand-
ing the fact that sentencing courts possess discretion to deviate from the recommended
sentencing range.”154
Disregarding the wording of the statute, it is still necessary to examine it under
the vagueness framework, specifically whether the statute “define[s] the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what con-
duct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement.”155
The same reasoning the Court applies in Johnson to the residual clause of the
ACCA can be applied to the wording of the residual clause in the Guidelines: “unlike
the part of the definition of a violent felony that asks whether the crime ‘has as an
element the use . . . of physical force,’ the residual clause asks whether the crime
‘involves conduct’ that presents too much risk of physical injury.”156 It is unclear
exactly what an ordinary person could look to in order to determine whether a cer-
tain activity would “involve conduct” that presents too much risk of physical injury
to another.157 Because the residual clause of the Guidelines is also examined under
the categorical approach like the ACCA,158 it would require the potential offender
to have to think about the “ordinary” case of the crime and the potential risk of injury
to another in such an ordinary case.159
Measuring the risk of physical injury to another for a crime one is about to
commit might be possible; if one were to break into a home, there is almost certainly
a serious potential risk of injury to another.160 However, it is unclear exactly how
one imagines an “ordinary” break-in and the risk it would entail.161 As the Johnson
152 See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
153 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
154 Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (2013).
155 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
156 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
157 Id.
158 See United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 443 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States
v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1995).
159 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
160 United States v. Walker, 631 F. App’x 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that second-
degree burglary of a dwelling under Florida state law is a crime of violence).
161 David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209, 220–21 (2010) (“[A] sentencing court
has few tools to determine reliably the ‘ordinary’ commission of a crime. Without better
guidance, courts have tried several approaches, including the use of statistics, applying their
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Court states, there are multiple ways to attempt to measure the risk,162 but without
knowing what a court might consider the law is unclear.163
For these same reasons, such a statute, when viewed in the light of the vagueness
doctrine and the requirement of the categorical approach, also invites arbitrariness
and discrimination from judges. When it is unclear for an ordinary person to mea-
sure the risk associated with an “ordinary” case of a crime, it is likely that judges
would have the same problem. Without more clarity on how to establish an “ordi-
nary” case of a crime or what amounts to a serious potential risk of injury, it is likely
that different judges will have different opinions on the same crimes, and at the very
least are allowed to have different opinions, which is the essence of what vagueness
law under the Due Process Clause is attempting to prevent.164
While there have been attempts by courts to create a standard for U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2,165 similar attempts were made to create a standard for 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B),166 and if such attempts were not enough to salvage § 924(e)(2)(B)
in Johnson, then they are also not enough to salvage § 4B1.2.167
B. 18 U.S.C. § 3286(b)
There are many other federal statutes that can rightfully be compared to the “po-
tential risk” standard of the residual clause.168 This Note will analyze one, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3286(b), which illustrates a similar standard to the others.169 Section 3286(b)
‘intuitive belief’ to hypothesize how the crime is usually committed, and imagining how the
crime could be committed in the exceptional case.”).
162 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557; see also supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
163 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
164 See supra Part I.B.
165 See generally Walker, 631 F. App’x at 756; United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 802 F.3d
28, 37 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that burglary and robbery under Puerto Rico law are not
crimes of violence); United States v. Simmons, 782 F.3d 510, 518 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the crime of escape is not a crime of violence because it is not similar in kind to the
enumerated offenses or similar in the degree of risk posed).
166 See generally Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015) (holding that vehicular flight from a law enforcement officer
under Indiana law is a violent felony); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122–23 (2009)
(holding that failure to report to a penal institution under Illinois law is not a violent felony);
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 140 (2008) (holding that New Mexico’s offense of driving
under the influence is not a violent felony); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 209 (2007),
overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015) (holding that Florida’s offense
of attempted burglary is a violent felony).
167 United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The concerns about
judicial inconsistency that motivated the Court in Johnson lead us to conclude that the residual
clause of the Guidelines is also unconstitutionally vague.”).
168 See supra notes 53, 68.
169 See supra note 53.
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regards the extension of the statute of limitations for certain terrorism crimes, and
states, in relevant part, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, an indictment may be found
or an information instituted at any time without limitation for any offense listed in
section 2332b(g)(5)(B), if the commission of such offense resulted in, or created a
foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury to another person.”170 Thus, the
standard in § 3286(b) is “foreseeable risk” of death or serious bodily injury,171 com-
pared to a “potential risk” of physical injury standard in the residual clause.172
To the common eye, these two standards seem similar. A risk that is foreseeable
is inherently similar to a risk that is potential. One would think that, even if there
were some difference between the two, that if one were labeled so vague as to be
unconstitutional, it would be difficult to explain how the other could escape the same
fate. The Court tries to do so, but its reasoning is not compelling.
Disregarding the similarity in wording of the statute, it is still necessary to examine
it under the vagueness framework, specifically whether the statute “define[s] the crimi-
nal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrim-
inatory enforcement.”173
The majority distinguishes statutes such as this one from the residual clause on
two grounds: first, that “[a]lmost none of the cited laws links a phrase such as
‘substantial risk’ to a confusing list of examples”;174 second, that “almost all of the
cited laws require gauging the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant
engages on a particular occasion,” as opposed to the Taylor Court creation of the
categorical approach for residual clause cases.175
Regarding the first reason, § 3286(b) is linked to a confusing list of not four
crimes like the ACCA’s residual clause, but instead forty-five different crimes, covering
a plethora of acts.176 Many statutes have a list of examples and then a “residual clause”
that is meant to encompass like crimes so that there are no loopholes in the statute,
so that no one can claim that a crime may be violent but it is not explicitly listed.177
170 18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
171 Id.
172 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012), invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2551 (2015).
173 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
174 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015).
175 Id.
176 18 U.S.C. § 2332(g)(b)(B)(i) (2012) (“section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or
aircraft facilities), 37 (relating to violence at international airports), 81 (relating to arson within
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),
175c (relating to variola virus), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), subsection (a), (b), (c),
or (d) of section 351 (relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and
kidnapping), 831 (relating to nuclear materials), 832 (relating to participation in nuclear and
weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States), 842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic
explosives) . . . .”).
177 See, e.g., § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012).
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An ordinary person cannot tell the difference between a “foreseeable risk” of death
or serious bodily injury and a “potential risk of physical injury to another.” As the
Johnson Court states, there are a multiplicity of ways to attempt to measure the
risk178 and not knowing how a court will assess that risk, or even what a court would
look to, makes it impossible for an ordinary person to understand the law.179 Both
statutes are linked to a set of examples, the standard is the same for both, and both
can be approached the same way, and thus with the Court’s ruling, § 3286(b) must
be unconstitutional.
Regarding the second reason given by the Court, this Note has already discussed
why the courts should not be forced to use a categorical approach and should instead
gauge the riskiness of conduct “on a particular occasion.”180 The Court is again
saying that the residual clause is only a vague statute because of the categorical
approach, yet then saying it will not change from the categorical approach because
of impracticability, yet then saying that statutes that use such an impractical process
are constitutional.181 This argument is circular, and § 3286(b) is just as unconstitu-
tional as the ACCA section.182
If the ACCA residual clause invites arbitrariness and discrimination from judges
with a “serious potential risk” standard,183 it is difficult to say that a “foreseeable
risk” standard would not invite the same arbitrariness from a judge. What may seem
foreseeable to one judge may not to another, and if there is no clear standard for judg-
ing a foreseeable risk, then there is none for judging a potential risk.
Furthermore, the fact that § 3286(b) is not a sentencing provision like the residual
clause means that it should be scrutinized even more than the residual clause.184 A
vagueness challenge is particularly weak with a sentencing statute because it focuses
on what happens after the conduct in question, not the criminality of the conduct.185
In other words, the concern should be about whether or not a person knows if
certain conduct is criminal, not whether a person knows exactly how long of a sen-
tence said conduct would incur. In reality, no one knows with certainty what any
sentence will be until a sentencing hearing is conducted due to different sentencing
calculations, consideration of mitigating factors, and the discretion given to the
judge.186 The Due Process Clause does not require that a would-be offender know
178 See supra notes 131–32, 161.
179 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
180 See supra Part II.
181 See supra Part II.A.
182 See generally Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551.
183 Id. at 2551.
184 See id. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 468
(1991)) (stating that “since whatever debate there is would center around the appropriate sen-
tence and not the criminality of the conduct,” a vagueness challenge is weak).
185 Id.
186 See supra note 90.
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what his or her sentence will be if he or she commits a crime, but only what does and
what does not constitute a crime.
CONCLUSION
This Note examined the recent Supreme Court case of Johnson v. United States
and argued that the Court’s reasoning was flawed, while also illustrating the many
questions the decision raises regarding statutes similar to that of the residual clause
of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
The main argument of this Note is that the problem with the residual clause is
not with the wording of the clause, but instead with the categorical approach used
to interpret the clause. The Court repeats time and again that assessing the “potential
risk” requires a judge to imagine the idealized ordinary case of the crime.187 This
process, called the categorical approach, is the problem; just because applying the
categorical approach to this issue causes vagueness problems does not mean the
statute should go away, but instead that the categorical approach should.188
The solution this Note proposes is a facts-based approach where a court can look
to the facts of a defendant’s past conviction in assessing whether or not it constituted
a violent felony. Much like the circumstances of a criminal action are researched and
mitigating factors are considered at a normal criminal sentencing,189 the circum-
stances of the crime are essential in determining whether it was violent.
The many concerns the Court expounded in Taylor that led to the establishment
of the categorical approach for residual clause cases190 are greatly alleviated in the
age of technological records.191 Additionally, if facts are indeed unavailable for the
prior conviction, then the government simply fails to meet its burden192 and the
conviction cannot be used. This approach is preferable because it still allows for the
statutes to address criminals with prior violent felonies not enumerated in the ACCA,
instead of limiting the statute to only the few violent felonies listed.
Finally, this Note looked to the aftermath of Johnson, arguing that there are now
many federal statutes with standards similar to that of the residual clause that are
now unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), a Sentencing Guide-
line provision with the exact wording of the ACCA residual clause,193 must be deemed
unconstitutionally vague for the same reasons194 the ACCA clause was deemed vague.
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3286(b), a federal statute governing an extension of
187 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (majority opinion).
188 See supra Part II.
189 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
190 See supra Part I.C.1 and accompanying notes.
191 See supra Part II.B.
192 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
194 See generally Part III.A.
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the statute of limitations for certain crimes of terrorism,195 has a similar standard of
“foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury,”196 and, given that it should be
scrutinized even more than a sentencing statute like the ACCA,197 should also be
deemed unconstitutionally vague. These are just two of the dozens of statutes that
use similar standards198 to those of the residual clause and are now placed in doubt
due to the holding of Johnson.
There is much left to be discussed that this Note, regrettably, does not touch upon.
What exactly changed between 2011 and 2015 that caused such a dramatic shift in
the Court’s treatment of the residual clause? Should prisoners currently serving
largely increased sentences under the residual clause be able to receive resentencing
hearings? What role did or should the doctrine of stare decisis have played in the
Court’s decision-making?
There are many questions left for courts in the immediate future as well. What
will happen to prisoners who attempt to revive an appeal based on this decision?
How are lower courts going to interpret the applicability of Johnson to other statutes,
such as U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)? Will the Court hear another case in the near future to
decide the circuit split on this issue?
In closing, the Supreme Court ruling that a federal law is unconstitutionally
vague is nothing new. However, declaring a statute unconstitutionally vague a mere
four years after stating that that same statute “states an intelligible principle and pro-
vides guidance that allows a person to ‘conform his or her conduct to the law,’”199
is new, and deserves attention.
This Note, ultimately, argued that the Court’s opinion in Johnson was funda-
mentally flawed by focusing on the categorical approach to the residual clause instead
of simply changing to a facts-based approach. It illustrated the deep questions left
to be answered with regards to the constitutionality of many other federal statutes
using a “substantial” or “foreseeable risk” standard. It is unclear what will happen
in the future, but the sentences of many prisoners sentenced under the Armed Career
Criminal Act’s residual clause, and with outstanding appeals pending, are likely
going to be dramatically changed.
195 See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
196 Id.
197 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 53.
199 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (2011)).
